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The Road to Nowhere:
Caterpillar v. Usinor and CISG Claims by Downstream Buyers Against
Remote Sellers
Donald J. Smythe*
Introduction
The first issue to resolve in any contract dispute is which body of
contract law applies. The task is not as simple as it sounds or as it once was.
In an international contract dispute the court must first apply private choice
of law rules to determine which nation-state's laws govern. If the court
determines that U.S. law applies it must then decide which body of U.S.
law. There are a hundred and one different sets of contract rules that could
apply to an international contract dispute under U.S. law alone. If the parties
have places of business in different Contracting States and the contract is
for goods for non-household uses then the UN Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods ("CISG", "the Convention") applies under
federal law.1 If the parties do not have places of business in different
contracting states and the contract is for non-household goods, or if the
parties do have places of business in different Contracting States and the
contract is for household goods, then some U.S. state's version of Article 2
of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) will apply.2 If the contract is not
for goods of any kind then some state's version of the common law will
* Donald J. Smythe, B.A., M.A. (Carleton University); M.Phil., Ph.D. (Yale University);
J.D. (University of Virginia); Professor of Law, California Western School of Law.
1 See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 1(a),
Apr. 11, 1980, S. TREATY Doc. No. 98-9 (1983), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, available at
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/treaty.html [hereinafter CISG]. The U.S. Senate
ratified the CISG in 1986 giving it the force of federal law when the Convention came into
effect on January 1, 1988. See also BP Oil Int'l, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de
Ecuador (PetroEcuador), 332 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 2003) ("The CISG, ratified by the
Senate in 1986, creates a private right of action in federal court."). As of January 20, 2010
a total of 74 nations have ratified the CISG and thus become "Contracting States." See Pace
Law School Institute of International Commercial Law, CISG: participating countries (Jan.
22, 1998), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries-United.html.
2 In some Contracting States the CISG might apply even if the parties do not have places of
business in different Contracting States under CISG, Article 1(b). The U.S. has, however,
declared a reservation to Article 1(b) as permitted by CISG, Article 95. Thus, Article 1(b)
does not apply under U.S. law. See U.S. Ratification of 1980 United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 52 Fed. Reg. 6262-02 (March 2, 1987)
[hereinafter U.S. Ratification of CISG] ("United States ratification was coupled with a
declaration that the United States would not be bound by Article I(1)(b), which will have a
narrowing effect on the sphere of application of the Convention.").
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apply.3 Since there are fifty states this adds up to a hundred and one
different sets of contract rules that could apply to the parties' dispute.
In the modern world, with its growing volume of transnational
transactions this is too many rules. Indeed, the purpose of the CISG is to
promote uniformity in international sales law and good faith in international
trade.4 Although the CISG itself only seeks to bring uniformity to a limited
set of international contracts, it was the product of larger forces to bring
harmony and uniformity to international law and facilitate the expansion of
international trade and commerce.5 It is important to remember that the
CISG was the product of a bargain between representatives from many
nations with a diverse range of legal systems. As a consequence, the CISG's
rules are quite spare by comparison to U.S. law and they are stated in
unfamiliar language that is devoid of many U.S. commercial law terms. The
spare structure of the CISG's rules and the unfamiliar terms inevitably raise
questions of interpretation. What are courts to do when they face questions
that the CISG does not explicitly address, at least in terms with which they
are familiar?
The CISG itself offers some guidance on this question: Under
Article 7(1) courts are directed to interpret the CISG's provisions in a
manner that promotes uniformity in its application and good faith in
3 In some cases it may be difficult to determine whether the contract is for goods or
services. Both the CISG and U.S. case law apply a test for determining whether the
contract should be treated as one for the sale of goods. The majority of courts in the U.S.
apply the predominant factor test under domestic law. BMC Industries, Inc. v. Barth
Industries, Inc., 160 F.3d 1322, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998). This approach is similar to the test
applied under the CISG, Article 3(2). See Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat
on the Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods and the
Protocol amending the Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of
Goods, 7, U.N. Doc. V.89-53886 (June 1989):
Since the Convention applies only in respect of international sales
contracts, it clarifies whether contracts involving certain services are
covered. A contract for the supply of goods to be manufactured or
produced is considered to be a sales contract unless the party who orders
the goods undertakes to supply a substantial part of the materials
necessary for their manufacture or production. Furthermore, when the
preponderant part of the obligations of the party who furnishes the goods
consists in the supply of labor or other services, the Convention does not
apply.
' See CISG, supra note 1, preamble & art. 7(1).
5 See Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchantment of Codification in the Common-Law World, 25
YALE J. INT'L L. 435, 445 (2000).
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international trade.6 Article 7(2) indicates that when confronted with an
apparent gap in the CISG, courts must first look to the general principles
upon which the CISG is based and, if they fail to find any, then select the
domestic legal rules applicable under private choice of law rules.7
Unfortunately, this invites controversy. It encourages parties to find gaps in
the rules so that they may argue for the application of domestic laws that
work to their advantage. To the extent that courts are susceptible to these
arguments, the scope of the CISG is narrowed and diverse domestic laws
displace uniform international laws in the adjudication of international sales
disputes. The purpose of the CISG is thus undermined.
The problem is vividly illustrated by a recent U.S. federal district
court case in the Northern District of Illinois: Caterpillar v. Usinor.8
Caterpillar addresses a fundamental contracting problem: whether a
downstream buyer - a buyer who bought goods from a remote seller
through some intermediary - can make a contract claim against a remote
seller - a seller who sold goods to a downstream buyer through some
intermediary. The court in Caterpillar thus had an opportunity to contribute
to the development of a coherent body of international sales law and
promote good faith in international trade. It did exactly the opposite. The
court accepted an argument that the preemptive effect of the CISG was
limited to contract claims by the seller's immediate buyer and construed the
CISG to require privity. It also allowed the downstream buyer to make a
domestic contract claim against the remote seller under the common law
doctrine of promissory estoppel. Part I of this essay provides a Statement of
the Case. Part II, the Analysis Section, argues that the court succumbed to
an overwhelming "homeward trend bias" and rendered an opinion that
undermines the CISG and confounds Illinois law. Part II further argues that
the court could and should have reached the same outcome by developing a
theory for allowing downstream buyers to make claims against remote
sellers under the CISG.
6 CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1) ("In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had
to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and
the observance of good faith in international trade.").
7 Id. art. 7(2) ("Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not
expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it
is based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by
virtue of the rules of private international law.").
8 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, 393 F. Supp. 2d 659 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
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I. Statement of the Case
A. A Fork in the Road
The case arose from a set of transactions that Caterpillar undertook
to supply its customers with mining trucks at various locations in the U.S. 9
To that end, Caterpillar negotiated with Usinor Industeel ("Usinor"), a
French steel company, and its own Mexican subsidiary, Caterpillar, Mexico
("CMSA") for the supply of steel to CMSA so that CMSA could use the
steel in the manufacture of the truck bodies. 10 Usinor represented to
Caterpillar and CMSA that its steel was of a new type called "Creusabro
8000" which was harder, stronger, welded better, and could be processed
more cheaply than regular steel. 11 In fact, Usinor even supplied Caterpillar
with a sample of the steel and indicated that the sample was representative
of the steel they could provide in substantial quantities. 12 Caterpillar
informed Usinor that the steel would be used for truck bodies and gave
Usinor the design specifications. 
13
Based on these representations from Usinor, Caterpillar submitted
proposals to its customers to manufacture dump trucks using the Creusabro
steel. 14 After contracting to supply trucks to many of its customers,
Caterpillar contracted with CMSA for the supply of truck bodies and
CMSA contracted with Usinor for the supply of Creusabro steel.
15
Caterpillar subsequently delivered new trucks to its customers. There were
apparently no problems with the trucks delivered in the first shipment, but
the bodies in several of the trucks delivered in subsequent shipments
cracked. 16 The cracks and potential for cracking made the vast majority of
the trucks that Caterpillar delivered to its customers inoperable. 17 In
9 The transactions were actually initiated by Usinor Idusteel and its North American
subsidiary, Usinor Industeel, USA, who were defendants in the case. They initially
requested a meeting with Caterpillar to present a sales pitch for Usinor's new "Creusabro"
steel. Caterpillar, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 664-65.
10 This explanation of the commercial dispute is a simplification. Caterpillar also
contracted for truck bodies manufactured with the Creusabro steel from an independent
company called Western Technology Services International, Inc. (Westech). The truck
bodies manufactured by Westech had the same defects as those manufactured by CMSA.
Id.
11 d.12 Id. at 665.
13 Td.
14 1d.
15 Caterpillar, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 665.
16 Td. at 666.
17
Td.
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addition, the steel proved to be of low quality and more difficult to use than
CMSA had been led to believe it would be so CMSA incurred higher than
expected costs in manufacturing the truck bodies. 18
B. The Road Taken
Caterpillar and CMSA filed a complaint against Usinor seeking
damages for repairs to cracked truck bodies, increased production costs, and
loss of goodwill. 19 The complaint alleged breach of express and implied
warranties under the CISG as well as the Illinois version of Article 2 of the
UCC, in addition to a promissory estoppel claim under Illinois common
law.20 In its defense, Usinor claimed, among other things, that all of
Caterpillar's and CMSA's UCC claims were preempted by the CISG, and
that since the CISG states that it governs only the formation of the contract
of sale and the rights and obligations of the seller and buyer, only CMSA
had standing to assert any claims.21
The case thus raised a question about the preemptive effect of the
CISG. Since the CISG is federal law, the court correctly observed that this
22was essentially a question about the CISG's scope. Under the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution the CISG clearly preempts any state law
23causes of action within its scope. z Caterpillar argued that the CISG could
only preempt state law claims by CMSA. z4 The court did not directly
address this issue. Instead, in a subtle but important way, the court shifted
the framing of the question from one about the preemptive effect of the
CISG to one about standing to bring claims under the CISG.z5 The court
18 I-d.
19 The complaint also named Usinor's North American distributor, Leeco Steel Products,
Inc. (Leeco) and its North American subsidiary Usinor Industeel, Inc. (Usinor USA). Id. at
667. The counts filed against Leeco and Usinor USA were in the alternative to the counts
filed against Usinor in the event that Leeco and Usinor USA were found not to be Usinor's
agents. Since the court did find that Leeco and Usinor USA were Usinor's agents these
alternative counts were dismissed. Id. at 672.
20 Id. at 667. There was also a claim under French law in the alternative to the application
of U.S. law but the court dismissed that claim as well. Id. 669.
21 Id.; see CISG, supra note 1, art. 4 (stating that the CISG governs "only the formation of
the contract of sale and the rights and obligations of the seller and buyer arising from such
a contract.").
22 Caterpillar, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 667.
23 [d.
24 [d.
25 See id. at 673-74. The court in Caterpillar interprets Article 4 of the CISG to limit
claims to those by the buyer against the seller. Id. at 674. But Article 4 indicates that the
CISG governs only the "rights and obligations of the seller and buyer." CISG, supra note 1,
Vol. 2, Issue 2 Spring 2011
Geo. Mason J. Int '1 Comm. L.
noted that it was CMSA that bought the steel from Usinor, not Caterpillar,
and that only CMSA could therefore assert claims against Usinor under the
26CISG. Since Caterpillar was not a party to the contract between CMSA
and Usinor, Caterpillar did not have standing to bring claims against Usinor
under the CISG and the CISG did not therefore preempt Caterpillar from
27bringing state law claims against Usinor. As the discussion below will
elaborate, this was an unfortunate error in the court's logic.
Caterpillar made UCC claims against Usinor for breach of express
and implied warranties as well as a promissory estoppel claim under Illinois
common law.28 Illinois law however, requires privity of contract for the
recovery of economic damages under UCC express or implied warranty
claims.29 Caterpillar attempted to establish that certain exceptions to the
privity requirement applied, but the court disagreed.3 ° Caterpillar was thus
left with only its promissory estoppel claim. Under Illinois law a plaintiff
can assert a promissory estoppel claim by alleging that (i) an unambiguous
promise was made, which was (ii) reasonably and justifiably relied upon by
the promisee, that (iii) the reliance was expected and foreseeable by the
promisor, and that (iv) the promisee relied to her detriment.31 Usinor argued
that none of the statements it had made to Caterpillar constituted
unambiguous promises since they were merely representations of fact and
opinion, and that Caterpillar's promissory estoppel claim should therefore
have been dismissed too.32 The court, however, again disagreed. The court
therefore allowed CMSA to proceed with CISG claims against Usinor but
not with any Illinois UCC or common law claims, and it disallowed
Caterpillar from proceeding with any CISG claims or Illinois UCC claims
but allowed it to proceed with an Illinois common law promissory estoppel
claim. This confounded both the CISG and Illinois law.
art. 4. It does not state that the CISG limits claims to those by the immediate buyer against
the seller or that it precludes claims by downstream buyers against upstream sellers. Id.
26 Caterpillar, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 674. This conclusion presumes, of course, that under the
CISG a seller can only have obligations to a party with which it is in privity of contract.
That is not at all clear. See Ingeberg Schwenzer and Mareike Schmidt, Extending the CISG
to Non-Privity Parties, 13 VINDOBONA J. OF INT'L COM. L. & ARB. 109, 114-15 (2009)
(contending that just because the CISG is silent regarding third-party claims against sellers
does not mean that it precludes such claims).
27 Caterpillar, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 673-76.281 Id. at 667.
29 Id. at 677-78.
3 1 Id. at 678.
31 1d. at 679-80.
32
_d. at 680-81.
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II. Analysis
This section argues that the Caterpillar court's opinion undermines
efforts to unify international commercial law. It argues that the court should
have interpreted the CISG to preempt any domestic contract laws, including
the UCC and the doctrine of promissory estoppel. It argues that, by
allowing domestic contract claims, the Caterpillar court failed to promote
good faith in international trade or make any effort to apply the CISG in
conformity with the general principles upon which it is based. Moreover, it
argues that the court confounded both the CISG and Illinois law when it
construed the CISG to require privity of contract for a breach of contract
claim and allowed a domestic contract claim against the remote seller under
the common law doctrine of promissory estoppel. If followed, Caterpillar
will not only create disunity in international sales, impede good faith in
international trade, and promote forum shopping, but it will also diminish
the amount and value of information remote sellers provide about their
goods and distort their decisions about their distribution systems. Finally,
this section proposes an alternative approach: courts should instead construe
the CISG to preempt all domestic contract claims and find a way of
allowing downstream buyers to make claims against remote sellers under
the CISG itself The CISG can be construed to allow downstream buyers to
make claims against remote sellers under Article 16(2)(b), a provision that
is similar to the common law doctrine of promissory estoppel.
A. This is the Road to Nowhere: Problems with the Caterpillar Decision
To begin with, the Caterpillar court construed the scope of the
CISG too narrowly. Indeed, the court misapplied Article 4 of the CISG
when it construed the preemptive effect of the CISG to extend only so far as
the CISG confers standing on a party to bring a cause of action. On the
contrary, since the CISG is federal law its preemptive effect extends to any
matters within its scope. Although Article 4 states that the CISG governs
only the "formation of the contract" and the "rights and obligations of the
seller and buyer," this should at the very least mean that the CISG governs
all the contractual rights and obligations of the seller and buyer and that it
therefore preempts any conflicting domestic contract laws that might
otherwise apply.33 As the court construed the case in Caterpillar there was a
Article 4 also states that the CISG is "not concerned with: (a) the validity of the contract
or of any of its provisions or of any usage; (b) the effect which the contract may have on
the property in the goods sold." CISG, supra note 1, art. 4(a). Neither of these limitations
seems relevant to the scope of a seller's obligations.
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contract between CMSA and Usinor for the supply of steel. This contract
was clearly governed by the CISG. Thus, any contractual obligations that
Usinor might have had towards a third party such as Caterpillar should have
derived from the provisions of the CISG.34 As the discussion below will
elaborate, the court might have found such obligations elsewhere in the
CISG if it had looked for them, but it did not.
Indeed, as the court construed the case there was a separate contract
between Caterpillar and CMSA for the supply of truck bodies.35 This
contract was also clearly governed by the CISG, since Caterpillar and
CMSA had places of business in different Contracting States.36 The CISG
should therefore have preempted any domestic contract laws that might
otherwise have applied to their transaction, including the UCC as well as
Illinois common law doctrines, such as promissory estoppel, which sound in
contract rather than property or tort. Thus, all the contractual rights and
obligations of both Caterpillar and CMSA should have derived from the
provisions of the CISG. It may be difficult to imagine which provisions of
the CISG may be construed to endow a buyer with rights against a third
party, such as a remote seller, but even if the CISG does not endow the
buyer with such rights, that does not justify the court in allowing the buyer
to assert claims under domestic contract law.
" This is the way other federal courts have construed the preemptive effect of the CISG.
See Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d. 236, 285
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("This Court concurs that 'the expressly stated goal of developing uniform
international contract law to promote international trade indicates the intent of the parties to
the treaty to have the treaty preempt state law causes of action."'); Asante Tech., Inc. v.
PMC - Sierra, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 2001) ("The Court concludes
that the expressly stated goal of developing uniform international contract law to promote
international trade indicates the intent of the parties to the treaty to have the treaty preempt
state law causes of action.").
35 Caterpillar, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 677. One of the puzzles in the case is why Caterpillar did
not attempt to rely on principles of agency to contend that it was a party to the contract
with Usinor for the supply of the steel. Perhaps the plaintiff's strategy was to expand the
scope of its claims. CMSA was clearly precluded from making domestic law claims and
Caterpillar would have been too if it was a party to the contract for the supply of the steel.
As a separate party contracting for the supply of the truck bodies, however, Caterpillar
could plausibly attempt to make domestic law claims.
36 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 1(a). Article 1(a) of the CISG states that it applies to
contracts of sale between parties whose place of business are in different Contracting
States. Since both the U.S. and Mexico had adopted the CISG before the contract was
formed, they were both Contracting States. See Pace Law School Institute of International
Commercial Law, Mexico (Jan. 22, 1998), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries
/cntries-Mexico.html; Pace Law School Institute of International Commercial Law, United
States (Jan. 22, 1998), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries-United.html.
Vol. 2, Issue 2 Spring 2011
Geo. Mason J. Int '1 Comm. L.
The court in Caterpillar construed the question of whether a buyer
under a CISG contract may have rights against a third party, such as a
remote seller, as a matter not addressed by the CISG. This is a dubious
construction of the CISG at best. Although Article 4 indicates that the CISG
governs only the formation of the contract and the rights and obligations of
the seller and buyer, this implies that once a contract has been formed under
the CISG it should define all the contractual rights and obligations of the
seller and buyer.37 The CISG might not preempt claims under tort or
property but it should preempt any claims under domestic contract law.38
By allowing domestic contract claims against Usinor even though it
held the CISG applied, the court in Caterpillar reflected the "homeward
trend bias" that the drafters of the CISG clearly hoped to avoid. 39 By
construing the preemptive effect of the CISG narrowly the court gave
broader effect to non-uniform domestic laws in a case where doing so
favored the domestic party. One of the problems in interpreting an
international convention such as the CISG, of course, is that there is no
international equivalent of the common law. 40 Nonetheless, excessive
recourse to domestic law in the face of apparent gaps in the CISG only
17 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 4 ("This Convention governs only the formation of the
contract of sale and the rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from such
a contract."); Geneva Pharm., 201 F. Supp. 2d. at 285; Asante Tech., 164 F. Supp. 2d at
1151.
38 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 4.
'9 References to a homeward trend bias in CISG jurisprudence abound in the literature. See,
e.g., LARRY DIMATTEO ET AL., INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
CISG JURISPRUDENCE 2-3 (2005); JOHN 0. HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE STUDIES, DELIBERATIONS, AND DECISIONS
THAT LED TO THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION WITH INTRODUCTIONS AND
EXPLANATIONS 1 (1989); Harry M. Fletcher, The Several Texts of the CISG in a
Decentralized System: Observations on Translations, Reservations and Other Challenges
to the Uniformity Principle in Article 7(1), 17 J.L.& COM. 187, 200-04 (1998). As the
Guide to the CISG, Article 7 explains, "[I]t is especially important to avoid different
constructions of the provisions of this Convention by national courts, each dependent upon
the concepts used in the legal system of the country of the forum." United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Commentary on the Draft
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Prepared by the Secretariat,
17, UN Doc. A/CONF.97/5 (Mar. 14, 1979), available at
http://www.globalsaleslaw.org/index.cfm?pagelD=644#Article /"20 1.
40 JOHN FELEMEGAS, AN INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS
(1980) AS UNIFORM SALES LAW 10 (2007).
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frustrates the CISG's purpose of promoting uniformity and encourages
forum shopping.41
Article 7(1) states that the CISG should be interpreted with "regard"
to its "international character" and "the need to promote uniformity in its
application and the observance of good faith in international trade." Several
scholars have argued that this requires courts to take a liberal approach to
interpreting its provisions as a body of international law, rather than as the
laws of the Contracting States.42 Article 7(2) states that "questions
concerning matters governed by [the CISG] . . . are to be settled in
conformity with the general principles on which it is based". Commentators
have argued that this suggests two interpretive methods: one involving an
examination of the general principles on which the CISG is based, the other
involving reasoning by analogy to other CISG provisions.43 These are very
broad tools, and even though the CISG may therefore appear to have many
gaps, most commentators argue there is a mandate for national courts to fill
the gaps and construct a body of international case law to support and
supplement the provisions explicitly stated in the CISG.44
Some foreign courts have recognized this mandate.45 Thus, in a case
involving a buyer that made repeated, though perhaps sporadic, purchases
over a two year period, a Finish court held that the seller had a duty to
continue supplying beyond the terms of any discrete transaction because the
buyer's "operations cannot be based on a risk of an abrupt ending of a
41 Id. at 11.
42 See e.g., Michael Joachim Bonell, General Provisions: Article 7, in COMMENTARY ON
THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 73 (C.M. Bianca
& M.J. Bonell eds., 1987); Felemegas, supra note 40 at 11-12; Bruno Zeller, The UN
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Good A Leap Forward towards
Unified International Sales Laws, 12 PACE INT'L L. REV. 79, 105-06 (2000).
13 See e.g., Bonell, supra note 42, 2.3.2 ("The formula used in Article 7(2) is to be
understood in a broad sense to cover not only recourse to, ogeneral principles>, but also
reasoning from specific provisions by analogy. The two approaches should however not be
confused, since they are complementary to each other and operate in a different manner.");
JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION 16-17 (4TH ED. 2009); Phanesh Koneru, The International
Interpretation of the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: An
Approach Based on General Principles, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 105 (1997).
" See e.g., Bonell, supra note 42, 2.2.1 ("[T]he Convention... is intended to replace all
rules in legal systems previously governing matters within its scope .... This means that in
applying the Convention there is no valid reason to adopt a narrow interpretation.").
15 See DIMATTEO ET AL., supra note 39, at 19-31 (discussing CISG methodology and
jurisprudence).
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contract., 46 The court's rationale was premised on interpreting the CISG to
include a general "principle of loyalty" which requires the parties to "act in
favor of a common goal" and "consider the interests of the other., 47 In
another case, an Austrian court held that the CISG authorized payment of
interest as a part of the contract damages even though Article 74 of the
CISG makes no mention of interest because of the general CISG principle
that "full compensation" was required. 48 Here the court inferred the
principle from other provisions of the CISG. 49 The point is not that the court
in either case was necessarily correct, but that references to the general
principles of the CISG and analogies to other CISG provisions have been
used by courts in other Contracting States to fill gaps in the CISG.
The implication is that the CISG is much broader than its rather
spare structure of rules and provisions would suggest, and its preemptive
effect on any adopting nation's domestic laws should be correspondingly
greater. Indeed, at least some foreign tribunals have apparently heeded the
admonishment in Article 7(2) to interpret the CISG in conformity with the
general principles upon which it is based. 50 American courts should do the
same. The court in Caterpillar, however, concluded that simply because the
CISG did not explicitly address the question of whether a downstream third
party has contract rights against a remote seller it was a matter to be decided
under domestic law. The court thus not only misconstrued the preemptive
effect of the CISG on the parties' contract rights, it also failed to make any
effort to apply the CISG in conformity with the general principles upon
which it is based. This was hardly in concert with Article 7(1)'s directive to
interpret the CISG with regard to its international character and the need to
promote uniformity and good faith in international trade.
In fact, the decision in Caterpillar undermined principles of
uniformity and good faith in international trade even more directly. The
court's decision implies that a remote seller under a CISG contract may
46 See Plastic carpets case, Helsingin hoviokeus [Helsinki Court of Appeals], Oct. 26, 2000,
S 00/82 (Fin.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/001026f5.html; see also
DIMATTEO, supra note 39, at 24-25 (stating that the Helsinki Court of Appeals held that a
two-year business relationship justifies a duty of loyalty).47 
Td.
41 See Rolled Metal Sheets (Austria v. F.R.G.), Internationales Schiedsgericht der
Bundeskammer der gewerblichen Wirtschaft [Arbitral Trib. - Vienna] June 15, 1994, SCH-
4318 (Austria), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/
940615a4.html.
49 DIMATTEO ET AL., supra note 39, at 26-27.
50 See id. at 19-31 (discussing CISG methodology and jurisprudence).
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have contractual obligations to downstream third parties under domestic
contract law. Usinor was found potentially liable to Caterpillar for a
promissory estoppel claim.51 In fact, if Illinois law did not have privity
requirements for express and implied warranty claims under the UCC,
Usinor would also potentially have been liable for breaches of UCC
warranties. Many states do not have such privity requirements.52 In those
states the consequences of the court's narrow interpretation of the CISG
would have exposed Usinor to an even wider range of domestic contract
claims. The court's decision implies that the legal obligations of a seller in a
CISG contract depend on whether the seller's buyer contracts with a third
party in the U.S. and which state's laws apply to the contract. Caterpillar
thus hardly promotes uniformity in international trade - even across states
within the U.S.
Indeed, the domestic laws of some other Contracting states under the
CISG also have privity requirements (or their equivalent) for at least some
contract claims.53 Thus, if courts in those nations follow Caterpillar and
interpret the preemptive effect of the CISG narrowly, any contract breach of
warranty claims under their domestic laws will be barred by the privity
requirement. Moreover, many Contracting states do not allow actions for
promissory estoppel or any equivalent foreign doctrine.54 Thus, third parties
51 One could debate, of course, whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel properly
belongs in contract, but it at least arguably creates contract-like obligations. U.S. courts
have generally agreed. See Geneva Pharm., 201 F. Supp. at 286 (("Breach of contract and
promissory estoppel are 'two sides of the same coin, and that coin is a cause of action for
breach of contract."') (citing Qatar Nat'l Navigation & Transp. Co. v. Citibank, No. 89 Civ.
464 (CSH), 1998 WL 516117, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 1998) ("Promissory estoppel is
an equitable remedy, the asserted effect of which ... is to estop [Citibank] from denying
the existence of the contract pleaded."); Pitak v. Bell Atl. Network Servs. 928 F. Supp.
1354, 1367 (D.N.J. 1996) ("Promissory estoppel is a cause of action related to breach of
contract.").
52 See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 406 (5th ed.
2000) ("[T]he law permits a non-privity buyer to recover for direct economic loss if the
remote seller has breached an express warranty. Where the buyer cannot show reliance on
express representations by the remote seller, however, the case law is in conflict.").
53 Privity is a common law doctrine and so vestiges of the requirement remain in many
common law nations. See, e.g., Francis Dawson, New Zealand Privity of Contract Bill, 2
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 448, 451, 453 (1982); Michael Trebilcock, The Doctrine of
Privity of Contract: Judicial Activism in the Supreme Court of Canada, 57 U. TORONTO
L.J. 269, 269-70 (2007).
5' European courts in civil law systems, for instance, do not recognize the doctrine of
promissory estoppel and generally do not allow as many gratuitous promises to be enforced
as U.S. courts. See, e.g., HEIN KOTZ & AXEL FLESNER, EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 76-77
(Tony Weir trans., 1997).
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like Caterpillar might have no recourse under their domestic contract laws
against a remote seller like Usinor. If followed, Caterpillar could thus
establish a system under which American third parties such as Caterpillar
might be able to make domestic contract claims against CISG sellers like
Usinor (depending on which state's laws applied), but similarly situated
third parties in foreign Contracting States might not. This would undermine
a basic principle of reciprocity and equal treatment.55 Caterpillar is thus
antithetical to good faith in international trade.
It may also promote forum shopping. There is a well-known
homeward trend in the application of choice of law rules under private
international law.56 Suppose that Alpha, with place of business in
Contracting State A, contracted for the sale of goods to an intermediary,
Beta, with place of business in Contracting State B, who then contracted for
the resale of the goods to Gamma, with place of business in Contracting
State C. Suppose that State A's domestic laws included a privity
requirement but State C's domestic laws did not. Suppose that Gamma
wished to bring an action for breach of warranty against Alpha. Suppose
there was enough flexibility in the choice of law rules to allow a court to
apply its domestic laws and suppose courts were inclined to exhibit a
homeward trend. Under Caterpillar Gamma would obviously prefer to file
an action against Alpha in State C rather than in State A. Given the
homeward trend in the application of choice of law rules, this would
probably allow Gamma domestic actions against Alpha under the laws of
State C that would be unavailable under the CISG or the laws of State A.
Such forum-shopping would only exacerbate Caterpillar's tendency to
promote disharmony in the application of the laws governing international
sales.
55 The U.S. implied the need for reciprocity in the application of the CISG by declaring a
reservation under CISG, Article 95 excluding the application of CISG, Article 1(b). See
U.S. Ratification of CISG, supra note 2. By declaring a reservation against Article 1(b) the
U.S. ensured that the CISG will not apply to parties with places of business in the U.S.
unless it would also apply to the parties with places of business in the foreign states when
parties with place of business in the U.S. are contracting with parties with places of
business in the foreign states. See id.
56 See, e.g., RICHARD FENTIMAN, FOREIGN LAW IN ENGLISH COURTS: PLEADING, PROOF,
AND CHOICE OF LAW 29-30 (1998); OTTO KAHN-FREUND, GENERAL PROBLEMS OF
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 467 (1976); PETER MACHIN NORTH, ESSAYS IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 69 (1993); JUHA RATIO, THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL CERTAINTY IN EC
LAW 114 (Francisco Laporta ed. 2003).
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Caterpillar not only impedes the development of international sales
law, it also potentially confounds Illinois state law. As the court notes,
Illinois has a privity requirement for both breach of express warranty claims
and breach of implied warranty claims seeking economic damages under the
UCC. 57 Caterpillar was in fact barred from making any UCC claims
whatsoever. The court nonetheless held that Caterpillar should be allowed
to assert a claim under Illinois law using the doctrine of promissory
estoppel. Privity of contract is obviously not required for a promissory
estoppel claim in Illinois or elsewhere, but the court's decision to allow the
claim raises questions about the meaningfulness of the privity requirement
for UCC warranty claims. Did the court allow Caterpillar to do an end run
around the Illinois privity requirement using the doctrine of promissory
estoppel?
Under the circumstances of the case, Usinor clearly made
affirmations of fact and other claims directly to Caterpillar that Caterpillar
apparently relied on to its detriment in contracting to supply trucks to its
customers. These circumstances, however, are close if not equivalent to
those in which a party creates an express warranty under the UCC. Under
the currently enacted version of the UCC in Illinois (and all other states), a
seller creates an express warranty under UCC § 2-313(1)(a) by making
affirmations of fact or promises that relate to the goods and become part of
the "basis of the bargain.,, 58 As UCC § 2-313(1)(a) has been applied by
most courts, the buyer's reliance on the seller's affirmations is essential to
whether the affirmations become part of the basis of the bargain.59
Nonetheless, as the official comments point out, no particular reliance needs
to be shown "in order to weave [the affirmations] into the fabric of the
agreement., 60 Once made the affirmations are presumed to become part of
the basis of the bargain unless the seller can adduce facts sufficient to take
61them out of the agreement.
The court in Caterpillar thus allowed a promissory estoppel claim in
circumstances in which the plaintiff might otherwise have made a breach of
express warranty claim but for the privity requirement. As the opinion made
clear, there were direct communications between Usinor and Caterpillar
which encouraged Caterpillar to rely on Usinor's affirmations, and other
57 Caterpillar, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 677, 678.
58 [d.
59 Donald J. Smythe, The Scope of a Bargain and the Value of a Promise, 60 S.C. L. REv.
203, 215 (2008).
61 U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 3 (2002).
61 id.
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courts might limit the case to similar circumstances in which the defendant
communicated to the plaintiff directly. Of course, there is no logical reason
why the case should be interpreted so narrowly. A downstream third party
can rely on affirmations or promises that are made in advertisements or on
the labels of products every bit as much as it can on those that are made
through direct communications. If other courts are persuaded by Caterpillar
and interpret it broadly then the privity requirement for breach of express
warranty claims in Illinois becomes largely moot. Illinois plaintiffs will
simply assert promissory estoppel claims instead. Thus, in addition to
undermining the uniformity of international sales law and good faith in
international trade, Caterpillar also confounds Illinois law.
B. We Have to Get Out of this Place
There are alternative approaches to the privity problem in
international sales that are much more firmly grounded in the principles of
the CISG than the decision in Caterpillar. The most obvious alternative
would simply be for courts to construe the CISG more broadly so as to
preempt downstream buyers from making any domestic law claims against
remote sellers. Without more, this would restrict downstream buyers in
circumstances like Caterpillar's to suing their immediate sellers. Their
immediate sellers, of course, might then file actions against the remote
sellers. Indirectly, then the remote sellers could still be made liable for
damages to downstream buyers.
Of course, one problem with this alternative is that the downstream
buyer might not always have a cause of action against its immediate seller.
The remote seller would then evade all liabilities. And even if the
downstream buyer did have a cause of action against its immediate seller it
is possible that the immediate seller might not have a cause of action against
the remote seller. This would allow the downstream buyer damages but it
would also allow the remote seller to evade any liabilities.
Nonetheless, even if downstream buyers had no recourse this would
not necessarily leave them completely vulnerable to being misled by remote
sellers. If downstream buyers were precluded from filing actions against
remote sellers they would probably be more likely to request that their
immediate sellers reiterate any affirmations or promises made by the remote
seller. This would then ensure that they had a cause of action against
someone. If their immediate sellers were unwilling to reiterate the
affirmations or promises then the downstream buyers would probably
choose not to rely on the affirmations. Of course, this presumes that the
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downstream buyers in these circumstances would have a sufficient
understanding of the legal rules and enough rationality to avoid mistakenly
relying on the remote sellers' promises. However, since the CISG only
applies to contracts for the sale of non-household goods, it will typically
only apply to parties that arguably should have at least some modicum of
business sophistication.62
The great advantage of this approach is that it would achieve
uniformity in the application of the CISG and promote good faith in
international trade. Whether a third party had a cause of action to remedy a
defect in a product would only depend on the application of the CISG, not
on any Contracting State's domestic law. Courts would not be able to
construe the preemptive effect of the CISG narrowly so as to apply their
domestic laws to the advantage of either party. Of course, they might still
exhibit a homeward trend in their application of the CISG, but this is a more
general problem with international law and it is doubtful that it would create
as many problems as Caterpillar.63 In theory at least, courts should construe
the CISG taking into account decisions of courts in other Contracting
States.64 If they follow this mandate then any homeward trend in the
application of the CISG should get resolved through further developments
in the case law.
Unfortunately, this approach to the problem might affect the
decisions that remote sellers make about their distribution chains. For
example, assume that the domestic law in Contracting State C would allow
an action by a downstream buyer, Gamma, directly against a remote seller,
Alpha, in Contracting State A. Under such an approach, a remote seller like
Alpha would have an incentive to distribute goods in State C through an
intermediary in another Contracting State - say State B - rather than
directly to buyers in State C itself or through an intermediary in State C. Of
course, if Alpha sold the goods directly to buyers in State C those buyers
would not be downstream and they could file actions against Gamma under
the CISG. Likewise, if Alpha sold the goods through an intermediary in
State C the downstream buyers might be able to file claims directly against
62 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 2(a) (stating that CISG does not apply to sales of goods
bought for personal, family or household use, unless the seller, at any time before or at the
conclusion of the contract, neither knew nor ought to have known that the goods were
bought for any such use).
63 See the discussion supra note 39.
64 This approach to construing the CISG would be in accordance with the direction in
Article 7(1)(a) to interpret the CISG to promote uniformity in its application and good faith
in international trade.
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Alpha under the domestic laws of State C. On the other hand, if Alpha sold
the goods to buyers in State C through an intermediary in Contracting State
B - say Beta - then the CISG would apply to the contract between Beta and
Gamma and this would preclude Gamma from filing claims directly against
Alpha.
Of course, Alpha might still be liable to Gamma indirectly. If
Gamma sued Beta under the CISG for a breach of a warranty that Beta had
made based on warranties that Alpha had made to Beta, then Beta could sue
Alpha under the CISG for any consequential damages.65
However, even if Alpha could be held accountable in such a manner
this approach would hardly promote judicial economy. If Gamma was able
to file an action directly against Alpha then there would only be a need for
one lawsuit instead of two. Of course, Beta might be named as a defendant
in that suit as well as Alpha, but even so Beta would only have to defend
itself against one suit rather than defend itself in one suit and prosecute a
second suit for consequential damages. In this respect, Beta's expected legal
costs would generally be greater and it would probably pass those costs on
to Alpha. It is unlikely, however, that these costs would be so high as to
make some other distributional arrangement more profitable for Alpha.66
From a social perspective, however, the extra legal costs incurred as a result
of the indirect liability of a remote seller to a downstream buyer would be
inefficient nonetheless. Moreover, these costs would likely be incurred
through similar distributional arrangements in the international sale of many
other goods as well. The total social costs could be quite significant.
Perhaps the greatest deficiency in this solution to the problem,
however, is that it acquiesces to the privity requirement. The privity
requirement is a vestige of an outmoded, narrowly doctrinal conception of
65 The CISG's damages provisions are quite liberal and allow claims for what would be
considered consequential damages under the UCC. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 74
("Damages for a breach of contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the loss,
including loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the breach.").
66 If the costs were so high as to make some other distributional arrangement more
profitable, of course, the point would be moot. It is highly unlikely, however, that the
expected legal costs would be so great as to outweigh the benefits of distributing through
an international intermediary in every case. Thus, some unnecessary social costs would
almost inevitably be incurred.
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67
contracts. It is essentially a mechanism for ensuring that any plaintiff that
proceeds with an action in contract was indeed a party to a bargain with the
defendant.68 Even in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century context
in which the bargain theory of contract achieved ascendancy, however, the
privity requirement made little sense. 69 The cases in which it applied then,
as now, were inevitably ones similar to Caterpillar in which a remote seller
sold goods to an intermediary who then resold them to a downstream buyer.
The downstream buyer was, of course, only a third party to the contract
between the remote seller and its distributor. With no privity of contract, the
downstream buyer was initially precluded from bringing any actions in
contract against the remote seller for damages caused by defects in the
product.70 Many of the suits, of course, were for damages arising from
personal injuries caused by the defects.71 Modern products liability law
evolved out of these cases and the privity requirement was eliminated for
72actions in tort. But some of the suits involved plaintiffs seeking only
economic damages for defects in the product. These cases remained a
matter for contracts and it is here that the privity requirement continues to
play a confounding role, at least in the U.S. and other common law
countries.73
The problem is not with the privity requirement itself, so much as
the way in which it applies. Privity has typically been applied by courts in
circumstances in which the court determined there were insufficient
contacts between the parties to create contractual obligations.74 Modem
67 See Smythe, supra note 59 (discussing the trend of courts increasingly looking to the
doctrines of promissory estoppel and quasi-contract to enforce seller's promises on express
warranty grounds without consideration and increasingly rejecting privity defenses).68 Td.
69 [d.
71 See, e.g., Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch. Of Pleas).71 id.
72 See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
7' As Gillette and Walt observe, "Where economic loss alone is involved, courts have been
more restrictive. Where economic loss affects the value of the product itself... courts tend
to permit actions against a distant seller. Where the economic loss is essentially
consequential.., courts have been more divided, with several continuing to require privity
before permitting recovery from distant sellers." CLAYTON GILLETTE & STEVEN WALT,
SALES LAW: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 308 (2d ed. 2002).
7' The concept of privity is slippery. Black's Law Dictionary defines privity of contract as
"[t]hat connection or relationship which exists between two or more contracting parties."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1199 (6th ed. 1990). In practice, privity of contract exists
wherever courts say it exists. See, e.g., Sjajna v. General Motors Corp., 503 N.E.2d 760,
769 (Ill. 1986) (finding that for practical purposes privity is established when the
manufacturer provides a written warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act).
Vol. 2, Issue 2 Spring 2011
Geo. Mason J. Int '1 Comm. L.
contract law revolves, of course, around the doctrine of consideration and
the theory that a contract requires a bargain.75 A promise does not create a
76contractual obligation unless it is truly bargained for. In applying the
privity requirement, therefore, courts have impliedly helped to define the
scope of a bargain as it is construed under modern contract law. It makes
perfect sense for courts to define and delimit the scope of a bargain. It
would be absurd, for instance, for courts to allow parties to make contract
claims against complete strangers. Modern tort law has developed causes of
actions for parties to make against complete strangers for a variety of
general legal wrongs. Indeed, the ultimate rationale for allowing tort actions
is that parties cannot reasonably be expected to coordinate all of their
interdependent behaviors by agreement and thus reduce all private legal
actions to ones in property and contract.77
The problem with the privity requirement is not that it restricts
standing to bring actions in contract to parties involved in a bargain but that
the conception of a bargain under the privity requirement has been unduly
narrow. In modern commercial contexts manufacturers commonly distribute
goods for the mass market through a variety of intermediaries. They also
commonly advertise to promote their sales and they may thus make many
affirmations and promises about the quality and characteristics of their
products that the ultimate buyers will see, read, or hear even though they
buy the goods from intermediaries. 78 The manufacturers may also make
affirmations or promises about their goods on the packaging in which the
goods are sold or on labels on the goods themselves or perhaps even in
writings sold with the goods. 79 American courts have struggled with the
question of whether affirmations of fact or promises made in these ways
create express warranties to the end consumers. 8° Many courts have held
75 See generally Roy Kreitner, Calculating Promises: The Emergence of Modem American
Contract Doctrine 15-22 (2007).
76 The doctrine of consideration is thus inextricably connected with the bargain theory of
contracts. Id. at 22.
77 This is one of the most interesting implications of the Coase Theorem, as elaborated by
Calabresi and Melamed. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089
(1972). In a world of zero transactions costs all parties would negotiate over all
interdependent behaviors in advance. See id. at 1094-95. There would be no need for torts
because every possible private legal wrong would be covered by contract. See id. Of
course, in the real world where transaction costs preclude such extensive contracting, tort
actions are necessary to regulate many interdependent behaviors. See id. at 1108-09.
78 See generally Smythe, supra note 59, at 217-24.
79 
1d.
80 Id.
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that they do, although a majority may require that the buyers actually do
see, read, or hear the communications for the affirmations or promises to
become part of the basis of the bargain. 81 In states where privity is required
for a breach of an express warranty claim, of course, the question is moot. If
the law requires privity for a breach of express warranty claim, and courts
hold that privity cannot be established between a downstream buyer and a
remote seller, then it cannot matter whether the buyer relied on the remote
seller's promises. The privity requirement has barred contract claims by
effectively restricting the scope of enforceable contractual bargains even
when the downstream buyer did clearly rely on the remote seller's
promises.
The problem, of course, is that even manufacturers that distribute
goods through intermediaries are ultimately targeting downstream buyers.
The use of intermediaries may help to insulate manufacturers from contract
claims, but intermediaries are rarely, if ever, significant end users of the
manufacturers' goods. Indeed, the reason manufacturers engage in
advertising and place product information on packaging and labels is
because they want to promote sales to the end buyers. It may have made
sense to confine the scope of a bargain and standing to make contract claims
to buyers and their immediate sellers prior to the transportation revolution
in the nineteenth century that initiated the rise of mass-scale production by
making the distribution of goods across vast distances and legal
jurisdictions profitable, 82 and it may even have made sense immediately
after the transportation revolution simply for reasons of judicial economy
and expedience, 83 but it hardly makes sense in the modern era of cheap
transportation and electronic communications. 84 If the manufacturers of
mass-produced goods advertise or promote them through their packaging or
labels then they can and should be considered to have contracted with
anyone who might reasonably rely on the affirmations or promises
contained therein.
85
As a general matter, both economic efficiency and social ethics are
best served by holding sellers to strict legal obligations for any affirmations
81 1d.
12 See generally Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in
American Business (1977) (providing a historical overview of commercial production and
distribution in the U.S.).
83 Id.
84 GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 73, at 308.
85 [d.
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or promises they make about their goods.8 6 To the extent that sellers are
able to use the privity requirement to evade those obligations, the
requirement only undermines economic efficiency and impedes the
development of sound business ethics.8 7 It is perhaps not surprising,
therefore, that the modern trend in both American and foreign law has been
towards the elimination or diminishment of the privity requirement." The
argument that the privity requirement is an obsolete vestige of the pre-
modern world that undermines economic efficiency and sound business
ethics has no less force in international sales law than in the domestic laws
of nation states.
C. There is a Way to Get from Here to There: The Article 16(2)(b)
Approach
The difficult question, perhaps, is can the privity requirement be
eliminated from international sales transactions without undermining the
integrity of the CISG? The short answer to the question is, "yes." The
wording of Article 4 limits the scope of the treaty to the rights and
obligations of the seller and buyer, but the CISG does not define the term
"seller" or "buyer" and the only way it offers of inferring the definition of a
contract is from the provisions in Articles 12 through 23 on the formation of
a contract. Given the invitation to courts to fill in the gaps in the CISG by
reference to its underlying principles and to interpret its provisions in a
manner that promotes good faith in international trade, this leaves open the
possibility that such terms could be construed quite broadly. In fact, there
are at least two possible approaches to resolving the privity problem under
the CISG. One approach is to define the scope of a seller's obligations
under Article 4 broadly enough to bind a remote seller to obligations for any
promises made to downstream buyers. Another approach is to interpret
Article 16(2)(b) to encompass the doctrine of promissory estoppel -- or
86 Smythe, supra note 59, at 208-12, argues that sellers make promises in order to
distinguish the quality of their products from others on the market and thus avoid the so-
called "lemons problem." Relieving sellers from liabilities for their promises only
undermines their efforts, reduces the information available to buyers, and diminishes the
economic efficiency of markets.
17 See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT As PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATIONS 19 (1981) (articulating a moral obligation to keep promises regardless of
whether consideration is present).
88 See JOHN 0. HONNOLD & CURTIS R. REITZ, SALES TRANSACTIONS: DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 272, 291-92 (3d ed. 2006); JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL SALES § 63 (3d ed. 1999); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 11-7 (5th ed. 2002).
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something very much like it. Both of these approaches would arguably be
consistent with the CISG's underlying principles.
One distinguished commentator, John Honnold, has argued that
Article 4 may be interpreted to extend the obligations of a remote seller
under the CISG to encompass promises or guarantees that it makes to
downstream buyers. 89 On this view, the promises or guarantees made by the
remote seller to the downstream buyer are a part of a larger commercial
contract in which the downstream buyer's immediate seller is merely an
intermediary. 90 Technically, the remote seller need not be construed as the
downstream buyer's "seller" but the transaction between the remote seller
and downstream buyer can still be construed as a "contract of sale." 91 This
approach is more compelling the more the remote seller does to encourage
the downstream buyer to make the purchase. Promises or guarantees made
by the remote seller itself are more likely to create a unilateral contract than
promises or guarantees that are impliedly made by the remote seller through
its controls over an intermediary dealer under the terms of a franchise
agreement. 92 As Honnold cautions, however, if the downstream buyer and
the remote seller's dealer have places of business in the same Contracting
State the CISG would not apply to the contract.
93
One potential problem with this approach is that it might logically
imply that the remote seller is also liable for other claims under Article 35 -
claims that resemble implied warranties in U.S. law. If the remote seller's
89 HONNOLD, supra note 43, at 76. Honnold acknowledges that this is a change in position
on the issue from the one he had taken in earlier editions of the book, in which he had
opined that the language of Article 4 limited the seller's obligations to the immediate
buyer. Id. Honnold, in fact, observes that the court in Asante, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (N.D.
Cal. 2001), did allow a U.S. buyer to make claims against a remote Canadian manufacturer,
although the court appeared to be "blithely unaware of any issues raised by the fact that the
claim was against a party who had not sold the goods directly to the buyer." Id. at 78.
Honmold nonetheless concludes that "it is unlikely that the Convention in the foreseeable
future will play a large role in claims by buyers against manufacturers and similar remote
suppliers." Id. at 77.
9 
-1d. at 76.
9 1 d. at77.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 77. Of course, in the case where the downstream buyer and the remote seller's
dealer have places of business in the same Contracting State the contract between the
remote buyer and the dealer would be governed by the domestic law of the buyer's and
dealer's locations. In the U.S. this would mean some state's version of Article 2 of the
UCC would be the applicable law. In many states privity is not required for an express
warranty claim and so the manufacturer might well be liable under domestic law. GILLETTE
& WALT, supra note 73, at 308.
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promises or statements are construed to make the larger transaction between
the remote seller and downstream buyer a contract of sale under the CISG
then all the other provisions of the CISG would arguably apply, including
the implied warranty-like provisions in Article 35.94 This could be
problematic. Article 35 expressly authorizes the parties to contract around
these implied warranty-like provisions. 95  The CISG arguably also
authorizes the parties to contract around the damages provisions, including
the provision in Article 74 for consequential damages. 96 Sophisticated
sellers often do seek to limit or exclude their exposure to implied warranties
and consequential damages. It is difficult to imagine how a remote seller in
a foreign Contracting State could limit or exclude implied warranties and
consequential damages in a contract of sale that is implied rather than
bargained-for with a downstream buyer.
Articles 14(2) and 16(2)(b) of the CISG offer an alternative
approach to the privity problem that may therefore be even more appealing
and might also prove to be more flexible in application. Article 14(2)
provides that offers may be made to indefinite persons; 97 Article 16(2)(b)
states a provision that to those trained in the common law seems redolent of
the doctrine of promissory estoppel, even though it is not stated in those
94
[T]he goods do not conform with the contract unless they: (a) are fit for
the purposes for which goods of the same description would ordinarily be
used; (b) are fit for any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made
known to the seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract, except
where the circumstances show that the buyer did not rely, or that it was
unreasonable for him to rely, on the seller's skill and judgment.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 35(2)(a).
95 See id. art. 35(2). Article 35(2) begins with the qualification, "Except where the parties
have agreed otherwise .... Thus, it reiterates that the parties may exercise the autonomy
to contract around the implied-warranty-like provisions otherwise granted more generally
in Article 6. Article 6 states: "The parties may exclude the application of this Convention
or, subject to Article 12, derogate or vary the effect of any of its provisions."
96 Id. art. 74 ("Damages for breach of contract consist of a sum equal to the loss, including
loss of profit, suffered as a consequence of the breach."). Article 6 presumably implies that
the parties can derogate or vary the effect of this provision, including the part relating to
consequential damages. See id. art. 6 ("The parties may exclude the application of this
Convention or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its
provisions.").
97 _d. art. 14(2) ("A proposal other than one addressed to one or more specific persons is to
be considered merely as an invitation to make offers, unless the contrary is clearly
indicated by the person making the proposal.").
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terms. 98 However, it is important to remember that the CISG was a
compromise between representatives from diverse legal systems and the
drafters had to accommodate both common and civil law traditions.99
Although Corbin speculated that it would be unnecessary for civil law
countries to develop a theory of enforcement based on reliance because they
could simply make enforceable every promise upon which it would be
reasonable to rely, in general European legal systems have not provided
much protection to promisees who rely on promises.100 Article 16(2)(b) in
some sense may split the difference. Although it is strongly redolent of the
common law doctrine of promissory estoppel it established a reliance based
theory for enforcing offers without using the concept of estoppel. In
principle, this means that Article 16(2)(b) could be used as a "sword" and
not just a "shield" - in other words, it could be used by downstream buyers
to make claims against remote sellers under circumstances like those in
Caterpillar.101
Indeed, Henry Mather has noted the resemblances between Article
16(2)(b) and the doctrine of promissory estoppel under U.S. law. 10 2 There
are, however, also some important differences: Article 16(2)(b) does not
require that the offeree's reliance must have been foreseeable to the offeror
or that the offeree's reliance be detrimental to the offeree.10 3 Nonetheless,
Mather has predicted that "many tribunals will apply [Article 16(2)(b)] in
much the same fashion as American courts have used promissory
98 Td. art. 16(2) ("However an offer cannot be revoked: (a) if it indicates, whether by stating
a fixed time for acceptance or otherwise, that it is irrevocable, or (b) if it was reasonable for
the offeree to rely on the offer as being irrevocable and the offeree has acted in reliance on
the offer."). As Mather writes, "[Article 16 2(b)] looks very much like American
promissory estoppel doctrines, although it does not expressly require that the offeree's
reliance must have been foreseeable to the offeror and does not expressly require that the
offeree's reliance be detrimental." Henry Mather, Firm Offers Under the UCC and the
CISG, 105 DICK. L. REV. 31, 48 (Fall 2000).
99Andrea Vincze, Revocability of offer: Remarks on whether and the extent to which the
UNIDROIT Principles may be used to help interpret Article 16 of the CISG, in
FELEMEGAS, supra note 40, at 85 (observing that CISG, Article 16(2)(a) was included to
incorporate the civil law concept of irrevocable offers and CISG, Article 16(2)(b), which is
very similar to the doctrine of promissory estoppel, was included to accommodate the
common law).
100 JAMES GORDLEY, THE ENFORCEABILITY OF PROMISES IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW
343 (2001).
101 Historically, the doctrine of promissory estoppel arose as a defense to an action brought
by another rather than as a basis for a cause of action itself. Id. at 58, 62.
102 See, e.g., Mather, supra note 97; Vincze, supra note 98.
113 Mather, supra note 97, at 48.
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estoppel." 10 4 Indeed, the federal district court for the Southern District of
New York has agreed with this interpretation of Article 16(2)(b) in Geneva
Pharmaceuticals Technology Corp v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.10 5 As the
court explained, Article 16(2)(b) "establishes a modified version of
promissory estoppel that does not appear to require foreseeability or
detriment, and to apply an American... version of promissory estoppel." 
10 6
The court therefore concluded that domestic promissory estoppel claims
could be preempted by the CISG.
1 0 7
Article 16(2)(b) thus appears to provide a basis for holding remote
sellers like Usinor to claims by downstream buyers like Caterpillar for any
promises they make in the marketing and distribution of their goods.
Hypothetically, if the court in Caterpillar had followed the court in Geneva
Pharmaceuticals the same logic that it had used to apply the doctrine of
promissory estoppel under Illinois law could have been applied to allow
Caterpillar to make a CISG claim against Usinor under Article 16(2)(b).
Apparently, however, Caterpillar neglected to state a claim against Usinor
under Article 16(2)(b) and so this is only a conjecture. The facts in
Caterpillar are, however, quite specific: Caterpillar alleged that Usinor
made representations about its steel directly to Caterpillar prior to
contracting with CMSA. Caterpillar also alleged that it relied on those
representations to its detriment. Under those facts, the court applied
promissory estoppel. It is not clear, however, whether the court would have
applied promissory estoppel if Usinor had not made the representations
directly to Caterpillar. What if Usinor had made the same statements of fact
about its steel in advertisements or brochures or other promotional materials
rather than directly to Caterpillar?
In other words, does Article 16(2)(b) provide a basis under the CISG
for downstream buyers to make claims against remote sellers for statements
or representations the remote sellers make about their products that would
be sufficient to create warranties under Article 35 to their immediate
buyers? Logic suggests it does. Indeed, since Article 16(2)(b) suggests there
are no foreseeability or detriment requirements for promissory estoppel-like
claims under the CISG it would appear to be sufficient for the downstream
buyer to read, see, or hear the remote seller's statements or representations
about the product before purchasing the remote seller's goods from its
immediate seller for the downstream buyer to hold the remote seller liable.
104 d.
105 Geneva Pharm., 201 F. Supp. 2d 236 at 236.
106 Td.
107 Td.
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Article 16(2)(b) thus could provide a basis under the CISG for holding
remote sellers liable for statements sufficient to create the CISG equivalent
of express warranties under Article 35(1).
The question is whether courts will take up the opportunity. They
should. The privity requirement for express warranty claims makes little
sense in the modern commercial world where sellers place their goods in
the stream of commerce with the knowledge that they will often be resold in
foreign nations. Construing the CISG to require privity of contract simply
protects remote sellers from liabilities for claims they make in their
advertisements and promotional materials that are clearly intended to
increase their sales to downstream buyers. It thus undermines the reliability
and value of the information in those advertisements and promotional
materials. 108 It may therefore undermine the incentives for sellers to provide
such information altogether and thus reduce the amount of information
available to buyers overall. 10 9 Since this kind of information is an antidote
to the "lemons problem," inhibiting sellers from providing it or diminishing
its value to buyers is likely to cause an economic inefficiency. 110
It is also likely to impede good faith in international trade. One of
the bedrock propositions of Kantian moral theory is that it is wrong for a
person to make a promise without intending to keep it. It is true that the
CISG is an international treaty between nation states with diverse legal
systems and perhaps equally diverse mores and social values, but most
cultures place great moral value on the keeping of promises and would
likely adhere to this Kantian precept. Most would probably agree,
therefore, that a seller that made statements about its good in advertisements
or other promotional material without intending to keep them would be
acting in bad faith. Courts could thus promote good faith in international
trade by holding sellers liable for the statements they make in their
advertising and promotional materials, regardless of whether the sellers are
in privity of contract with the buyers who make the claims. Such an
approach would be faithful to the mandate in Article 7(1).
108 The argument is analogous to the one provided by Smythe against the reliance test that
courts commonly apply to determine whether express warranties have been made under
UCC § 2-313(1)(a). Smythe, supra note 59, at 216-236.
109 -d.
110 -d.
111 See Sharon Byrd & Joachim Hruschka, Kant on Why I Must Keep My Promise, 81 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 47 (2006) (discussing Kant's ethics concerning promises and the legal
implications of those ethics).
112 See generally P.S. Attiyah, the Rise and Fall of Contract 41-60 (1979).
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Finally, holding remote sellers liable for the statements they make,
directly or indirectly, to downstream buyers would also help to promote
uniformity in the application of the CISG as also required under Article
7(1). Since some courts, such as the court in Caterpillar, may be tempted to
allow downstream buyers to make domestic legal claims against remote
sellers if the CISG is construed to preclude similar CISG claims, non-
uniform domestic rules governing privity requirements may control. Indeed,
these non-uniform rules could encourage not only forum-shopping but also
distort the decisions that remote sellers make about their distribution
systems and the locations of their distributors. 113 By allowing downstream
buyers to make claims under the CISG instead, courts would not only
promote uniformity in international sales law, they would also advance
international justice and encourage economic efficiency.
Conclusion
The CISG was intended to facilitate and promote international trade
by improving the governance and legal certainty of international sales
contracts. Unfortunately, it offers a set of rules that are rather spare in
comparison with those of the UCC and presumably also the domestic laws
of other Contracting States. This invites parties to a CISG dispute to claim
that important questions fall within its gaps and thus argue for the
application of a favorable domestic legal rule to fill the gap. Courts have
frequently accepted these claims and thus applied domestic rules in disputes
under the CISG. This obviously confounds the purpose of the CISG and
will only impede the expansion of international trade and commerce. One
important matter that courts will inevitably have to address is whether
downstream buyers can make any CISG claims against remote sellers, and,
if not, whether they can then make any domestic legal claims.
The manner in which the U.S. federal district court for the Northern
District of Illinois addressed the issue in Caterpillar v. Usinor illustrates the
magnitude of the problem. The court in Caterpillar limited the preemptive
effect of the CISG to domestic contract claims by the remote seller's
immediate buyer. The court held the downstream buyer could make any
domestic contract claims against the remote seller that would be viable
under state law. Illinois has privity requirements for UCC breach of
warranty claims so these were not viable. The court nonetheless allowed the
downstream buyer to make a promissory estoppel claim under Illinois
113 See supra discussion in Part II.A.
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common law. The case thus not only confounds the purpose of the CISG, it
also confounds Illinois state law. It provides yet another example of the
homeward trend bias that threatens to undermine efforts to unify
international commercial law.
The best antidote to the problem is to encourage courts to construe
the preemptive effect of the CISG broadly to define all the rights and
obligations of the seller and buyer. Of course, this creates another dilemma:
because the CISG's rules are spare courts will either have to define the
rights and obligations of the seller and buyer very narrowly or find
expansive ways of construing the CISG's terms and principles. Claims by
downstream buyers against remote sellers are a case in point. If Article 4 of
the CISG is defined narrowly, so as to require privity for CISG claims, then
international sales law will remain underdeveloped and ill-suited to address
contracting problems in the modem commercial world. It is possible,
however, to define Article 4 more broadly and to find ways of allowing
downstream buyers to make claims against remote sellers for any
statements or promises the remote sellers make about their goods that would
be sufficient to create obligations to their immediate buyers under Article
35.
One possibility is to construe the downstream buyer and remote
seller as parties to a contract of sale. This approach could be problematic
since it might also make remote sellers liable for other obligations to their
downstream buyers under the CISG -- obligations that they might choose to
limit or modify if they were actually able to bargain. There is, however, a
better alternative. Article 16(2)(b) has been construed by both
commentators and courts to resemble the common law doctrine of
promissory estoppel. In principle, therefore, courts should be able to
construe Article 16(2)(b) to allow downstream buyers to make claims
against remote sellers in exactly the same circumstances as those that
presented themselves in Caterpillar v. Usinor. In fact, this essay has argued
that Article 16(2)(b) can be construed to allow downstream buyers to make
claims against remote seller for any statements or promises the remote
sellers have made in advertisements or other promotional materials
whenever the downstream buyers purchased the goods after seeing, reading,
or hearing them. The irony is that some reflection upon the court's holding
in Caterpillar suggests a solution to a much larger problem: how to
eliminate the privity requirement from international sales transactions
without undermining the integrity of the CISG.
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